The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 16
Issue 1 March

Article 2

March 1989

A Framework for Analyzing Knowledge Utilization in Social Work
Practice
Craig W. LeCroy
Arizona State University

Jose B. Ashford
Arizona State University

Mary Wirtz Macht
Macht and Associates - Oshkosh, Wisconsin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Social Work Commons

Recommended Citation
LeCroy, Craig W.; Ashford, Jose B.; and Macht, Mary Wirtz (1989) "A Framework for Analyzing Knowledge
Utilization in Social Work Practice," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 16 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol16/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

A Framework for Analyzing Knowledge
Utilization in Social Work Practice
CRAIG WINSTON LECROY

Jose B. ASHFORD 1

Arizona State University
School of Social Work
MARY WIRTZ MACHT

Macht and Associates
Oshkosh, Wisconsin

Methodological and conceptual limitations have resulted in knowledge
being defined so narrowly that we accept the inaccurate conclusion

that social workers fail to utilize knowledge. This article seeks to rectify
this problem by clarifying the concept of knowledge utilization in social
work practice. Toward this end a framework is proposed that makes
explicit the philosophy of science and practice assumptions germane

to the use of knowledge in practice.
In the last 10 years there has been much discussion of knowledge utilization and its impact on the profession (Brekke, 1986;
Heineman, 1985; 1983; Hudson, 1982; Schuerman, 1982). The
pivotal question in these discussions has been: do social workers use knowledge in their practice? However, these discussions
have ignored the assumptions underlying rival perspectives on
knowledge and on practice. In addition, the profession has lacked
appropriate conceptual tools for integrating perspectives of
knowledge with perspectives of practice. Furthermore, the philosophical underpinnings of the different conceptualizations of
knowledge and practice in social work have not been examined
in a systematic fashion. This situation is surprising since social
work has always had a long standing commitment to knowledge-guided practice (Gordon, 1962).
'The authors would like to thank Bob Moroney and Bob Leighninger for their
suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.
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The advancement of the profession will be limited until social workers value and use knowledge in their practice (Gordon,
1962; Reid & Smith, 1981). Since the utilization of knowledge is
essential to the professionalization of social work, it is important
that we understand how social workers use knowledge in practice (Ashford & LeCroy, 1988). This understanding is not easily
achieved because of different philosophical views of what constitutes knowledge. Indeed, an understanding of knowledge must
take place within the context of practice, but social workers adhere to diverse conceptualizations of practice.
The purpose of this article is to clarify existing conceptualizations of knowledge utilization in social work practice. Knowledge utilization is currently conceptualized in too narrow of a
fashion which has resulted in a lack of clarity regarding the
extent of knowledge used in practice. In order to rectify this
problem, a framework is described which is designed to organize the complex assumptions underlying the use of knowledge
in social work practice. The framework provides a mechanism
for critically analyzing competing perspectives of knowledge and
practice in social work.
Past Studies
Perhaps the most cited study of knowledge use in social
work practice is the 1968 study by Ronsenblatt (1968). He argued
that research findings are of critical importance to practitioners.
Rosenblatt (1968, p. 53) states: "if research holds little or no
value for practitioners, the activities of social work researchers
lose much of their purpose, for social welfare research is essentially applied research: its primary purpose is to improve services." The results of his study indicated that practitioners rarely
used findings from published research to inform their practice.
Casselman (1972) followed up on Rosenblatt's inquiry and found
similar results; practitioners are unlikely to read research articles. Using better research methodology, Kirk, Osmalov and
Fischer (1976) pursued the topic further only to conclude on a
similar note-social workers do little producing of research,
consuming of research, or consulting of research.
The results of the prior studies have led many people to
conclude that social workers are failing to uphold the profession's
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commitment to use knowledge in practice. However, this conclusion subscribes to a narrow understanding of knowledge appropriate for practice. It equates research utilization with
knowledge utilization. If we want to advance the profession by
enhancing knowledge use we must recognize the complexities
involved in integrating knowledge with practice. Marsh (1983,
p. 2) comments on recent studies of research utilization pointing
out that "they reveal a simplistic understanding of what research
can provide the practitioner as well as what information the practitioner needs to make decisions in practice."
Methodological Limitations
Most research has defined utilization in a narrow way giving
the misleading conclusion that social workers fail to utilize research. The utilization of research or knowledge is a complex
phenomenon that is difficult to measure. For example, Weiss
and Bucuvalas (1980, p. 35) in studying the topic of research
found that "its meaning is so unclear, its referents so foggy, that
people who are asked to describe their use of research discuss
vastly different behavior." Similarly, in examining knowledge
utilization, Larsen (1980, p. 429) states "studies limited to a single indicator of utilization, and one which is action-based, measure one narrow dimension and may be expected to miss
conceptual utilization entirely". When Caplan, Monison & Stambaugh (1985) studied research utilization, defined as the direct
influence of research findings on programs or decisions, it was
rare. However, when the concept of utilization was extended to
include consideration of research-based concepts and generalizations in formulating questions, setting goals, and planning
activities, it was found to be common. We must recognize that
the decisions of social workers may be influenced by countervailing knowledge generated from experience or research and
filtered down to practitioners.
Because research utilization has been measured in such a
narrow manner, it is unclear as to how much knowledge utilization there is among social workers. Social workers may make
knowledge-based decisions but may not remember the source
of their knowledge or distinguish when they are relying on other
means for decision making that would not be considered knowl-
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edge-based. While the process of research utilization is being
increasingly studied, it is the task of social work educators to
begin inquiry into how research findings can be both more
relevant and accessible to social work practice (Burkart, Holzner,
& Fischer, 1979; Rein & White, 1977; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980).
Marsh (1980, p. 2) in discussing research and practice decision
making, states a similar point about research utilization which
she claims "has suffered from exaggerated claims of the value of
research and from conceptually weak definitions of use." Indeed,
it is important to recognize that utilization results will undoubtedly be a function of the way in which utilization is operationally
defined. The conclusions that can be drawn are limited in light
of the narrow definitions frequently used in utilization studies.
Conceptualizing Utilization in Social Work Practice
Most authors who support research utilization differentiate
it from intuition or practice wisdom as if social work practice
were based on either one or the other. However, we must ask
the question, how do we come to know something. Perhaps we
need a philosophy of science framework in order to improve our
understanding of the use of knowledge in practice. Is scientifically-based practice predicated on the reading of research articles? Yet, practice wisdom and other forms of knowledge can be
useful and necessary parts of social work practice (DeMartini
& Whitbeck, 1986). In discussing practice wisdom, Bloom (1975,
p. 66) highlights its importance, "I believe that the issue of systematic formulation of practice wisdom is one of the unrecognized critical issues of the helping professions. Vast numbers of
individuals and agency innovations are effectively lost to others
who might profit from this knowledge."
Indeed, practitioners come to know things other than from
research-there are many ways of knowing, some better and
some worse. Without this realization we are painting an unrealistic and misdirected picture of what social work practice is
and can become. Furthermore, if we posit increased research
utilization as a desired goal what measure do we use to determine a reasonable level of research utilization? Is it reading three
research articles a day? Two a week? Or five a month? What
exactly does the knowledge-based, research-utilizing social
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worker look like? Until we have some idea of our goal, it is
difficult to assess any progress in that direction. Failure to read
research studies does not necessarily point to the demise of the
knowledge base of social work. Knowledge is transferred in
numerous ways. In fact, practitioners may well be using knowledge-guided or research-based interventions without having read
research articles.
Referring to only scientific research as usable knowledge creates a perceived gap between practice and knowledge which
may not necessarily exist. We cannot have a scientific conclusiveness outside of "ordinary knowledge" (Emmert, 1985), or in
the case of social work, practice wisdom. If we recognize a continuum of knowledge available for informing social work practice then the strain between these two activities becomes
weakened. This does not detract from the goal of social work to
create scientifically valid knowledge but places this goal within
the context of refining current practice theory. Writings on research utilization make too sharp a distinction between practice
wisdom and research-based decision making. As Thomas (1978)
points out, there are a variety of sources of basic information
useful for the process of developing human service technology.
These sources range from basic research to practice experience.
In a similar manner, Chambers (1975) argues that social science is inadequate and a poverty-stricken body of knowledge.
He believes we must recognize how incomplete science is and
that we have only this poverty-stricken body of knowledge from
which to work. He states "scientific knowledge is a necessary
but not sufficient knowledge base for deriving practice behaviors. Science is incomplete and practitioners will be without a
guide to action in many instances" (Chambers, 1975, p. 38).
The conceptual and the methodological limitations attributed
to the research utilization literature in the prior sections of this
paper suggest that researchers need to broaden their conceptualizations of knowledge-guided practice. In addition, it is argued that many researchers need to forego adhering to overly
simplistic constructions of professional practice. Towards this
end, a framework is described which is designed to organize
complex assumptions underlying the issue of knowledge usage
in social work practice.
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Framework For Evaluating Assumptions in
Knowledge and Practice
A framework is presented which assumes that any perspective on knowledge utilization is based on a philsophy of science
and a theory of practice. This framework identifies two dimensions relevant to understanding knowledge usage in social work
practice: subjective-objective and problem solver-scientist. These
dimensions incorporate a range of philosophy of science and
practice assumptions underlying existing perspectives on knowledge utilization. The subjective-objective dimension conveniently collapses the range of philosophy of science assumptions
into three sets of fundamental assumptions (ontological, epistemological, methodological) presented in the form of polarities.
In a similar manner, the problem solver-scientist dimension is
collapsed into three sets of fundamental assumptions (method,
state of knowledge, expertise) also presented in the form of polarities (See Figure 1).
The two dimensions in the framework define four quadrants
for evaluating knowledge in practice: subjective problem solver,
objective problem solver, subjective scientist, and objective scientist (See Figure 1). Each of these quadrants describe approaches to knowledge usage based on different philosophy of
science and practice assumptions (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In
essence, a framework is presented that organizes competing assumptions about knowledge and practice in social work.
The Subjective-Objective Dimension
The first set of assumptions incorporated in the subjectiveobjective dimension address the perennial debates in the social
and the behavioral sciences surrounding reality and its measurement. In fact, these assumptions are of an ontological nature
and apply to the very essence of the phenomenon under scrutiny
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Embedded in most ontological disputes is the controversy between Nominalist and Realist perspectives of reality. A nominalist perspective assumes that social
reality is not independent of cognition or of mind. That is, the
external world is nothing more than the names or the labels
used to structure that social reality. Whereas the realist perspective assumes that there is an external social world or reality
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Figure 1. Framework for Evaluating Knowledge in Practice
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independent of the mind. These alternative views translate into
rival positions on what is often referred to in the literature as
theories of truth (Smith, 1983). Nominalist often subscribe to
"coherence" theories of truth and realist subscribe to "correspondence" or "copy" theories of truth. In coherence theories of
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truth, confirmation is based on the intersubjective processes of
consensual validation. In copy theories of truth, confirmation is
established on the basis of empirical validation (Smith, 1983).
In practice situations, heuristics or rules of thumb derived from
consensual validation are highly consistent with correspondence
theories of truth; whereas data-based generalizations are tantamount to that of a copy theory of truth.
The second set of assumptions germane to this dimension
are of an epistemological nature. This set of assumptions confronts the controversy between anti-positivism and positivism
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In a positivistic epistemology, it is
assumed that the duty of a researcher is either to discover regularities in reality or to test the validity of hypothesized regularities. In fact, a central assumption in this epistemological
perspective is that there are regularities in reality. As a consequence, knowledge is viewed in this epistemology as data-based
generalizations. The function served by these generalizations is
to either predict or explain some facet of human activity. On the
other hand, an anti-positivist epistemology assumes that there
are no regularities in social realities and as a result researchers
should not seek to identify them. In this epistemological perspective, the goal of the social sciences is to understand (verstehen) rather than to explain or to predict human activity.
A dimension that is closely associated with ontological and
epistemological assumptions is that of methodology. In this
framework, the methodological set of assumptions reflect the
major polarities in the field of methodology between ideographic and nomothetic approaches (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).
The ideographic approach places the focus of scientific inquiry
on the individual. In addition, this approach stresses either explaining or understanding the individual (depending on one's
epistemological assumptions) rather than either the general or
the universal. It is also important to note that practice methods
may also adhere to similar assumptions which are often ignored
by researchers in their evaluatory efforts. Lastly, it is assumed
in the nomothetic approach that researchers should seek to explain or understand the general. As a consequence, the major
focus in a nomothetic approach is on making representative
generalizations.
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The Problem-Solver-Scientist Dimension
The problem solver-scientist dimension in this framework
has assumptions that are consistently ignored by researchers
involved in the study of knowledge utilization in social work
practice. The first set of assumptions relates to the long-standing
method controversy (LeCroy, Ashford & Hudson, 1986) in social
work practice. In this debate, practice is predicated on assumptions derived from either the pragmatic method or the scientific
method (Compton & Galaway, 1979). In the pragmatic method,
it is assumed that knowledge is best conceived of as an activity.
That is, knowledge is not conceived in this method as concepts
or ideas; instead, knowledge is defined as any activity which
results in consequences that resolve problems in living. Beyond
that, it is not assumed in this method that knowledge is a fixed
substance or a static set of concepts. Instead, it is assumed in
this practice method that social workers should not take for
granted that what "works" in one situation (which is considered
truth in the philosophy of pragmatism) will also "work" in other
situations (Stumpf, 1966). In essence, it is posited in this practice
method that social work is a process without fixed or verified
solutions to problems. On the other hand, it is assumed in approaches to practice based on the scientific method that there
are verified solutions to problem situations and that it is the
professional responsibility of social work practitioners to seek
verified solutions.
The second set of assumptions in the problem solver-scientist dimension involve state-of-knowledge concerns. In a sense,
these assumptions refer to the qualitative characteristics of the
knowledge available to decision-makers in problem situations.
These qualitative characteristics are conceptualized in this
framework as a continuum which moves from uncertainty to
certainty. The mid-point in this knowledge continuum is that
of risk. These levels of knowledge are defined by Geurts, Hart
& Caplan (1985, p. 337) as follows:
1. Certainty: all relevant variables regarding a problem and the
relationships among them are considered known.
2. Risk: all relevant variables regarding a problem are considered
to be known but their relationships can only be estimated.
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3. Uncertainty: all relevant variables regarding a problem are considered to be known but some cannot be measured and the
relationships among others are unknown.
Another issue that is closely associated with state of knowledge assumptions is that of practice expertise: inductive versus
deductive expertise. In a closed system, it is appropriate to assume that the situation is certain and that practitioners make
decisions and predictions based on principles from deductive
reasoning. These deductive reasoning assumptions are associated with what might be termed a deductive model of practice
expertise. In such a model, practitioners begin with verified
axioms or theories from which specific predictions about behavior or about interventive strategies are derived. Alternatively,
practitoners make predictions and decisions in open systems
based on an inductive model of practice expertise. In this model,
it is assumed that practitioners make their predictions in situations of risk or in situations of uncertainty. As a consequence,
they adhere closely to principles from inductive modes of reasoning. That is, they generally use systematically gathered observations, coupled with relevant contingencies inferred from
their experience and their training, to make their predictions
(Helmer & Rescher, 1959).
Four Quadrants For Evaluating Knowledge in Practice
The four quadrants in the framework are labeled subjective
problem solver, objective problem solver, subjective scientist and
objective scientist (See Figure 1). These labels categorize forms
of knowledge and styles of information usage in the practice of
social work. Each of these quadrants also incorporates different
philosophy of science and practice assumptions.
The subjective problem solver quadrant represents a label
that describes information used to solve problems in practice
that have not been subjected to scientific verification. In fact,
intuition, phenomenological reduction, and consensual modes
of agreement are typically the procedures used in developing
knowledge for this quadrant. It is also assumed in this quadrant
that knowledge cannot be generalized to other individuals or
situations. The need for generalizations is more characteristic of
the subjective scientist label. The subjective scientist seeks to
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generalize across persons and situations by systematically observing subjective phenomena. They often employ single subject
observations to make sense of subjective or private
(introspective) phenomena as well as test the validity of theoretical
hypotheses germane to subjective phenomena (Rychlak, 1981).
For example, single subject observations can measure internal
processes like subjective feelings or cognitive processes. Single
subject observations that measure external phenomena are more
characteristic of the objective scientist. The range of scientific
method assumptions are integrated within each scientific approach to knowledge usage. That is, it is important to recognize
that the subjective scientist may use either ideographic or nomothetic methods to study introspective phenomena. In summary, the framework seeks to make an important distinction
between the subjective scientist and objective scientist quadrants because they each have different perspectives on appropriate data sources, i.e., internal versus external.
The objective problem solver quadrant includes knowledge
based on observable experience that is subjected to inductive
reasoning processes and the pragmatic method. This quadrant
includes practice wisdom and practice principles derived from
observable experience. This observable experience is validated
by appealing to rational processes (reflective reasoning) rather
than to the scientific method. The objective scientist relies on
observable experience that is subjected to deductive reasoning
processes and the scientific method, i.e., ideographic or nomothetic. Data and theory-based generalizations are common forms
of knowledge found in this quadrant. Lastly, the objective scientist presumes that theoretical abstractions can be made that
are generalizable and verifiable.
To clarify the distinctions between the quadrants consider
the following practice situation: a practitioner is working with
a family that has been referred because of difficulties with their
teenage child. The subjective problem solver might make the
decision to confront the father with his lack of involvement. The
practitioner makes this decision on the basis of an internal feeling about the family at that moment. The form of knowledge
directing the intervention is based on an intuition stimulated by
the encounter with the family. The subjective scientist may make
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a similar decision, however, the decision may be based on either
repeated observations of the individual disclosures of the father
or theoretical constructs. For example, the use of repeated observations enables the practitioner to make generalizations consistent with inductive scientific principles and single system
technology. On the other hand, verified knowledge about disclosures of disengaged families may direct another subjective
scientist to confront the father and the child to share their experiences with each other. This subjective scientist is guided by
deductive reasoning and employs theory to direct the intervention; whereas the first subjective scientist is guided by data obtained from systematic observations of the family system and
inductive reasoning. The objective problem solver may observe
that every time the father was confronted about his lack of involvement he expressed more feelings toward the child. The
practitioner infers after observing the consequences of confronting the father that confrontation may be a successful strategy for
helping this father pay attention to his teenaged child. This approach is consistent with objective problem solving since the
emphasis is on making inductive inferences from successful experiences that achieve desired consequences. The objective scientist observes the family's interaction and classifies the family
according to its high rate of negative reciprocity. Upon making
this observation the practitioner decides to have the members
agree to exchange high rates of positive interactions. This decision is based upon a nomethetic research generalization that
suggests quid pro quo exchanges can have a positive impact on
negative reciprocity. The quadrants and dimensions in this
framework are a beginning attempt to understand a continuum
of knowledge and of practice underlying various perspectives on
knowledge utilization.
Unless we understand fully the concept of knowledge utilization, evaluations of knowledge use by social workers will remain narrow and misleading. This framework emphasizes the
differences between types of knowledge used and various conceptualizations of social work practice. It can be an aid to educators in evaluating the meta-theoretical and meta-philosophical
assumptions underlying practice and explanatory theories. By
using the two dimensions in this framework, educators can also
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classify types of knowledge used in practice. Furthermore, the
use of the framework makes explicit philosophy of science and
practice assumptions previously ignored in efforts to understand
knowledge utilization in social work practice.
Difficult distinctions were made for the purpose of putting
knowledge use into a continuum. For example, data-based generalizations were assigned to the subjective scientist and objective scientist quadrants to take into account different methods
(ideographic and nomothetic), however, it is also appropriate to
assign data-based generalizations to the objective problem solver and objective scientist quadrants based on different reasoning processes (inductive and deductive thinking). The value of
this framework is that it offers two dimensions (subjective-objective and problem solver-scientist) that allows for a more critical analysis of knowledge and practice than currently exists in
the profession.
Summary
Specific issues have been presented in order to reassess the
relationship between social work practice and knowledge utilization. An examination of utilization concepts and activities
has highlighted the difficulties in evaluating the profession's
progress toward utilizing knowledge in social work practice.
The social work profession is struggling with different notions concerning the nature of knowledge and the ways in which
knowledge is utilized (See, e.g., Brekke, 1986; Heineman, 1985;
Hudson, 1982; Schuerman, 1982). These conflicts are grounded
in epistemological as well as normative and conceptual differences. Many researchers have a hard time conceptualizing the
ways in which professional social workers use "knowledge" in
practicing social work. It is only considered knowledge when it
conforms to familiar conceptualizations. The dilemma in defining knowledge is summarized by Benne (1976, p. 167): "western
epistemologists, working for the most part, in modern times, in
universities, have not drawn their models of valid "knowing"
from the methods and products of thinking men and women of
action who guide, direct, and conceptualize the practical "makings" and "doings" of culture and society".
In order to recast knowledge utilization, taking into consid-
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eration epistemological and practice differences, a framework
was presented. It provides a mechanism for evaluating various
ways of knowing from pragmatic practice wisdom to scientific
research generalizations. It should also enable practitioners and
researchers to organize widely held conceptualizations of knowledge and practice. Only if we grapple with the complexities of
knowledge and practice can we make progress toward our societal mandate, a profession guided by knowledge.
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